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RESEARCH ARTICLE
Citizenship or Repression? Coca, Eradication 
and Development in the Andes
Thomas Grisaffi* and Kathryn Ledebur†
For over two decades the US has funded repressive forced coca eradication in Peru, 
Colombia and Bolivia to reduce the illegal cocaine trade. These policies have never 
met their stated goals and have generated violence and poverty. In 2006 Bolivia 
definitively broke with the US anti-narcotics model, replacing the militarized 
 eradication of coca crops with a community-based coca control strategy. The program 
substantially reduced the coca crop while simultaneously respecting human rights 
and allowing farmers to diversify their livelihoods. This article outlines the 
elements of the Bolivian initiative that ensure its continued successful functioning. 
It explores to what extent this model can be translated to other Andean contexts.
Successive US administrations have described 
illicit drugs as a threat to national security 
and have taken the battle to source regions. 
Over the past 30 years the US has channelled 
billions of dollars to South American military 
and police forces to enable them to under-
take counter-narcotics operations. In the 
Andean region the US has focused its efforts 
on the eradication of illicit crops (mostly coca 
leaf – which is used to produce cocaine – 
but also opium poppy and marijuana), law 
enforcement and the interdiction of drugs 
shipments. The aim of ‘supply side enforce-
ment’ is to curb the flow of illicit narcotics 
reaching the United States.
Historically, the US has dictated the 
terms of the ‘war on drugs’, and has used 
its political and economic might to crush 
any debate on alternatives. However, some 
Latin American leaders have begun to 
openly critique the failure of present  policies 
to achieve their goals and the high cost 
of implementing supply reduction efforts 
(in terms of violence, corruption and insti-
tutional instability). They have argued for 
more effective and humane alternatives and 
some countries have even made unilateral 
changes to drugs policy (see Grisaffi 2014b). 
As a result of pressure from Guatemala, 
Colombia and Mexico, the United Nations 
has scheduled a General Assembly Special 
Session (UNGASS) on drugs for April 2016. 
The outcomes of the Special Session will 
guide global drug policy cooperation for the 
coming years. The last UNGASS regarding 
drug policy in 1998 adopted the slogan ‘a 
drug free world, we can do it’,  but eighteen 
years later it has become clear that this is an 
unrealistic goal (Bewley Taylor 2012). This 
Special Session, then, provides an opportu-
nity for a profound shift in the global drug 
policy debate.
This article adds to the discussion through 
an analysis of illicit coca cultivation and the 
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policies to tackle it in the Andean region, with 
a specific focus on Bolivia. It draws attention 
to the harms generated by US-backed milita-
rized eradication and the aerial fumigation 
of coca crops, and explains why this policy 
ultimately fails to stem coca and cocaine pro-
duction. The article then introduces Bolivia’s 
innovative model for coca control, which 
shifts the focus from reduced hectares of 
coca to farmer subsistence, citizenship and 
respect for human rights. The model, known 
as ‘cooperative coca reduction’, allows regis-
tered farmers to grow a limited amount of 
coca while working with coca grower federa-
tions and the security forces to voluntarily 
reduce any excess coca production. Since 
2010 Bolivia has reduced coca acreage while 
simultaneously respecting human rights 
and successfully diversifying the economy 
in coca-growing regions. It is argued that 
cooperative coca control represents a more 
humane, sustainable and productive alterna-
tive to the forced eradication of coca crops. 
In the final section the authors examine 
the elements of the Bolivian initiative that 
 permit its continued productive implementa-
tion and explore their potential  applicability 
to other Andean contexts. 
This article is based on extensive long-
term ethnographic fieldwork and interview 
data.1 Grisaffi is an anthropologist who 
has spent over thirty months carrying out 
fieldwork in the Chapare (a coca-growing 
region of Bolivia) over several visits span-
ning the period 2005 to 2015. Ledebur has 
researched coca production in Bolivia since 
1999 as director of the Andean Information 
Network. The authors carried out interviews 
and participant observation with a broad 
range of informants, including coca  farmers 
and their families, landless labourers, 
agricultural union leaders, low-level coca 
paste producers, members of the security 
services and municipal officials. They have 
also interviewed Bolivian, US and EU policy-
makers, government officials, NGO agency 
staff and representatives of international 
organizations.
Figure 1: The security forces respond to a coca grower roadblock in the Chapare (Photo cour-
tesy of Godofredo Reinicke).
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Coca Regulation
Coca is a perennial shrub native to the 
Andean region; it grows in tropical areas at 
elevations of between 200 to 1500 meters. 
Coca leaf has been used for millennia by 
indigenous peoples in the Andean countries 
and is most commonly chewed or prepared 
as a tea. The people who consume coca 
value its properties as a mild stimulant but 
it also serves important social, religious and 
 cultural functions (Carter & Mamani 1986). 
Despite its many positive benefits and 
the coca trade’s historic importance to the 
regional economy, the leaf has always occu-
pied an ambiguous position in Andean 
society. Since the Spanish conquest, activ-
ists, legislators, scholars and the clergy have 
debated the legality of coca and its derivative 
products (Gootenberg 2008). In 1961 the UN 
classified coca leaf as a restricted drug (along-
side cocaine and heroin) under the Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs. The  convention – 
signed by Peru, Colombia and Bolivia – 
establishes that ‘the parties shall so far as 
possible enforce the uprooting of all coca 
bushes which grow wild. They shall destroy 
the coca bushes if illegally cultivated,’ and, 
‘coca leaf chewing must be abolished within 
twenty-five years’ (Metaal et al 2006). The 
1961 convention thus established the legal 
framework for future US-imposed coca eradi-
cation efforts. 
Peru, Colombia and Bolivia each have 
unique histories, cultures and traditions 
related to coca and, as a result, each nation 
pursues a different approach to enforcement. 
Colombia penalizes coca most severely, out-
lawing all aspects of production, consump-
tion and commercialization. Colombia has 
comparatively limited traditional consump-
tion2 and so unlike in Peru and Bolivia, there 
is no widespread support for its traditional 
uses (Ramirez 2011: 55). Furthermore, in 
Colombia revenues derived from the illegal 
coca trade have fuelled the country’s civil 
conflict (Peceny & Durnan 2006; Thoumi 
2002). The Colombian state has long 
embraced US-designed and funded forced 
eradication strategies, although recently its 
leaders have started to question the sustain-
ability of this approach. 
In Peru coca consumption is common in 
highland areas but is also consumed by mid-
dle class urban professionals, and is served 
to tourists in Cusco to help them cope with 
the high altitude. Peru’s coca legislation is 
less rigid than Colombia’s because while the 
state officially condemns coca chewing and 
prohibits private coca cultivation, it never-
theless authorizes limited coca production 
and commercialization for medicinal, scien-
tific and industrial purposes. Like Colombia, 
Peru receives significant US counter-drug aid 
and has ambitious plans to eradicate half the 
country’s coca crop over the coming years 
(Gootenberg 2014). 
Bolivia has the strongest coca culture of all 
the Andean countries. A recent EU-funded 
study calculated that about one third of 
Bolivia’s population regularly consumes coca 
or coca-based products, including coca teas, 
skin creams and liquor (CONALTID 2013). 
Bolivian President Evo Morales has led the 
battle for the decriminalization of coca leaf 
at the international level, arguing that the 
ban on traditional use is not only a historic 
mistake,3 but also discriminatory towards 
Andean peoples. In an unprecedented move, 
in 2011 Bolivia withdrew from the 1961 UN 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, before 
re-joining in 2013 with a reservation that 
permits coca consumption within its terri-
tory. Bolivia thus successfully reconciled its 
international commitments and its 2009 
Constitution, which declares that the state 
has a duty to preserve and protect coca chew-
ing as an ancestral practice.
Coca Cultivation 
Peru, Colombia and Bolivia are the world’s 
largest producers of coca leaf. The most 
recent UN coca surveys estimate that Peru 
has 42,900 hectares of coca (UNODC 2015c), 
Colombia 69,000 hectares (UNODC 2015a) 
and Bolivia 20,400 hectares (UNODC 2015b). 
In each country coca cultivation is concentrated 
in marginal areas, characterized by minimal 
civilian state presence, limited infrastructure 
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and high rates of poverty. In this context coca 
complements subsistence farming and, in the 
absence of other income generating activi-
ties, is one of the few pursuits that provide 
farmers with access to cash income – see 
Figure 5).  
Small-scale farmers grow coca because 
it has several comparative advantages as 
a cash crop. Coca can be harvested every 
three to four months; it is light and easy to 
transport; and almost all of the investment 
corresponds to labour costs and not to tools 
or other inputs, which leads to elevated lev-
els of employment – see Figures 2 and 4). 
Coca leaf generates far higher returns per 
hectare than any other crop and, most 
importantly, there is always a guaranteed 
market. Given the lack of legal alternatives 
and the high prices, much of the coca crop 
is sold to traffickers who process it into 
cocaine paste (the first step towards refining 
pure cocaine). In the Chapare coca-growing 
region of Bolivia, the people who process 
cocaine paste are generally young men with 
no land or hope of decent jobs. They set 
up artisanal laboratories in isolated areas, 
where they macerate shredded coca leaves 
in a range of chemicals including sulphu-
ric acid and gasoline to extract the cocaine 
alkaloid. The drug workers earn low wages 
for work that is dangerous, illegal and harm-
ful to their health (Grisaffi 2014a).
While coca has provided small farmers 
with economic opportunities, its cultiva-
tion is also associated with a range of nega-
tive environmental and social impacts. As 
coca is grown in isolated areas it expands 
the agricultural frontier and contributes to 
significant deforestation. In addition, the 
chemicals used to process cocaine paste, 
including gasoline and sulphuric acid, drain 
into streams and rivers, damaging delicate 
aquatic ecosystems (Young 2004; Salisbury & 
Fagan 2013).4 Researchers also point to 
Figure 2: A girl helps her mother dry coca leaves in the Chapare (Photo courtesy of Thomas 
Grisaffi).
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the negative social impacts; in Colombia 
the major guerrilla groups, including the 
Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces 
(FARC by its Spanish acronym) and right 
wing paramilitaries, finance their activities 
by taxing coca production. Farmers have 
been caught in the crossfire as illegal armed 
groups struggle for control over this lucra-
tive trade (Angrist & Kugler 2008; Ibáñez & 
Eduardo Vélez 2008). 
Forced Eradication
A cornerstone of US strategy in the Andean 
region has been the eradication of coca crops. 
Eradication is often carried out manually; 
teams of eradicators accompanied by heav-
ily armed members of the police enter small 
farmsteads to uproot illicit crops. Colombia 
was the only Andean country to allow the aer-
ial fumigation of coca crops. US policymakers 
are strong supporters of forced crop eradica-
tion; however, a growing body of research 
indicates that it does not meet its targets and 
generates wide-ranging harmful impacts. 
Eradication is inefficient; it generates 
incentives for poor farmers to replant as it 
forces up the price of coca, while simulta-
neously denying farmers their only source 
of income. Thus when crops are reduced in 
one area, production inevitably expands in 
other geographic locations; analysts refer 
to this as the ‘balloon effect’. For example, 
forced eradication in Peru and Bolivia in 
the 1990s pushed production to Colombia, 
which in 2009 became the world’s largest 
coca leaf producer. Consequently, although 
the amount of land under coca cultivation 
in Peru, Colombia and Bolivia fluctuated 
between 1987 and 2008, the total coca acre-
age in the Andean region remained stable, at 
around 190,000 hectares (Youngers & Walsh 
2010: 3).5 
Eradication has no obvious effect on drug 
production or the supply of drugs reaching 
consumer markets. Farmers have found ways 
to protect their crops from herbicides and to 
generate higher yields per hectare by increas-
ing the density of coca plants and using new 
Figure 3: Military police search Chapare residents (Photo courtesy of Godofredo Reinicke).
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combinations of fertilizers and pesticides. 
Moreover, cocaine paste manufacturers have 
employed new technologies and processes 
to extract more cocaine alkaloid from lower 
volumes of coca leaf. As a result, in spite of 
eradication efforts, potential cocaine produc-
tion in the Andes has also remained virtu-
ally unchanged (Mejia 2010; Mejia & Posada 
2008). 
Forced eradication puts the burden of 
the war on drugs onto small farmers (who 
gain the least from the trade) and generates 
multiple harms. Forced eradication immedi-
ately wipes out the family’s main source of 
income, frequently leaving people destitute 
and struggling to survive. Eradication also 
imperils targeted growers and their com-
munities by orienting the security forces 
towards internal ‘enemies’, often leading 
to human rights violations – see Figure 3. 
In all three countries eradication teams 
have killed, abused and seriously wounded 
scores of coca farmers, torched homesteads 
and incarcerated and tortured hundreds of 
people. Institutional damage has been com-
pounded by the impunity that US-backed 
security forces frequently enjoy (Youngers & 
Rosin 2005). 
Under the auspices of ‘Plan Colombia’6 
the Colombian government sprayed more 
than half a million hectares with herbi-
cide between 2000 and 2010 (Ramirez & 
Youngers 2011). The government has always 
argued that the chemicals used to spray coca 
are benign; however, anthropologist Maria 
Clemencia Ramirez (2011) has reported that 
people who live in spray zones suffer from 
a variety of ailments including skin, respira-
tory and gastrointestinal problems. They also 
complain that spraying is indiscriminate and 
carried out without warning. The herbicides 
have caused environmental damage (includ-
ing water contamination and land degrada-
tion) and have affected food and cash crops, 
undermining food security. Given the lack 
of alternatives, farmers often replant coca 
deeper in the jungle. Thus all that eradication 
achieves is to displace coca cultivation and 
spread the civil conflict to new areas (Dion & 
Russler 2008). The Colombian government 
acknowledges the poor results of fumiga-
tion and since 2007 has downscaled crop 
spraying and stepped up manual eradication 
missions, finally ending aerial fumigation in 
October 2015.
Forced coca eradication has provoked 
political instability in the Andean countries. 
In Peru and Colombia peasants have held 
national-level protests to campaign against 
coca eradication and in both countries ille-
gal armed actors (Sendero Luminoso [Shining 
Path] in Peru and the FARC in Colombia) 
have, on occasion, sided with coca grow-
ers to resist government eradication efforts 
(Durand Ochoa 2014; Ramirez 2011). In 
Bolivia, US-backed coca eradication catalysed 
mass discontent and demonstrations – see 
Figure 1 (Grisaffi 2010).  
The Myth of Alternative 
Development
The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
has increasingly come to view drug control 
as a ‘development issue’. Whilst ‘alternative 
development’ approaches have changed 
over the years, the aim remains the same: 
to wean people off cultivating illicit crops. 
However, with few exceptions, these pro-
grams have not offered poor farmers real-
istic alternatives to growing coca (Buxton 
2015; Mansfield 2011). An examination of 
US Agency for International Development 
(USAID)-designed and -funded programs in 
the Chapare, one of Bolivia’s principal coca-
growing regions, illuminates some of the 
limitations of ‘alternative development’.
USAID promoted export crops, such as 
bananas, coffee, cacao, palm heart and tim-
ber, even though these are unsuitable for 
the small peasant producer. Crops such as 
bananas and palm heart require a large initial 
investment, a sizeable workforce and large 
tracts of land in order to be profitable. Citrus 
fruit and cocoa beans take a long time to 
mature so any potential dividends take sev-
eral years to appear (thus many farmers went 
bust in the intervening period). USAID did 
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were markets for these products and made 
little effort to open out new ones. Thus most 
farmers found that they could not sell their 
‘alternative’ crops and sank into debt, unable 
to repay loans they had been encouraged to 
take out in order to plant the crops in the first 
place (Farthing & Kohl 2005; Lupu 2004). As 
one middle-aged female farmer told Grisaffi,7 
Sure, we have other products. . . you 
can grow just about anything in the 
Chapare; it is a fertile place. But these 
products are only good to eat. The 
prices are too low. We have oranges, 
thousands of oranges, but when we 
take them to the market they don’t 
sell. Sometimes you invest all of your 
money transporting them to the city 
but then you don’t make back what 
you paid out. You cannot make a liv-
ing that way!
US Development budgets for the Chapare 
were high, with estimates ranging from USD 
229 to USD 310 million spent between the 
beginning of the 1980s until 2004 (Farthing & 
Kohl 2005: 186). However, most of the 
money went to USAID contractors (wages, 
hotels, transport, offices and other over-
heads) instead of the nominal ‘beneficiaries’, 
provoking farmer resentment. Coca farmers 
had a clear narrative relating to these fail-
ures. A community radio manager in the 
Chapare explained, 
On my show I used to say, ‘Alternative 
development has the highest wages in 
Bolivia!’ Look – a driver for USAID had 
to spend 200 Bolivianos (about USD 
30) a day just on gasoline. Imagine 
that; they don’t even go 100 km. 
How much do you think a taxi driver 
spends on gasoline in a day? Not even 
80 bolivianos (about USD 12) and 
they run around all day. How about a 
technician? They have to spend fifty 
dollars a day just on subsistence. . . So 
I used to say, ‘we would be better off 
administering the money ourselves!’8 
USAID refused to work with the existing 
agricultural unions (hereafter the Coca 
Federation) or, until 2004, the municipal 
governments (which have been run by the 
Coca Federations since 1995). From 1998 
farmers had to cut their ties with the Coca 
Federations and join one of the USAID-
backed producer associations to receive 
development assistance. Associacionistas, as 
they came to be known, had to promise to 
no longer grow coca and denounce neigh-
bours who continued to do so. Many coca 
growers saw this as an attempt by USAID to 
divide and conquer the Coca Federations. 
As one Federation leader put it ‘we realized 
that the Yankees were trying to make us fight 
between comrades (community members).’ 
Others said, ‘the [USAID-contracted] NGOs 
came here to destroy the unions.’ In 2008 
the Coca Federations refused to permit any 
further USAID alternative development pro-
jects in the Chapare (AIN 2008). 
In Peru and Colombia the government, 
donor agencies and development contrac-
tors replicated these failed initiatives with 
little variation. In both countries there has 
been a lack of meaningful consultation 
with peasants’ organizations, poor sequenc-
ing of development assistance (conditioned 
on prior eradication), a lack of long-term 
planning and the promotion of crops aimed 
at the export market, which have proven 
to be unsuitable as there were often no 
markets for them (Buxton 2015; UNODC 
2005). USAID’s emphasis on promoting 
private agribusiness has had a range of 
harmful impacts including generating few 
jobs at low wages, damaging ecologically 
sensitive environments and encouraging 
the concentration of land ownership, thus 
contributing to rising levels of inequality – 
including within coca grower communities 
(Cabieses 2010; Vargas 2011; Youngers & 
Walsh 2010). In Colombia this develop-
ment model has been particularly damag-
ing. Paramilitaries have forced peasants 
from their land to allow for the expansion 
of large-scale commercial farming (Ballvé 
2013; Hristov 2009). 
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As coca growers have long known, no sole 
source of income will replace coca, especially 
in fragile tropical environments with poor 
infrastructure and minimum state presence. 
As a result, crop ‘substitution’ and ‘alterna-
tive’ constitute two of the fundamental 
myths presented as justification for forced 
eradication and their inevitable failure guar-
antees endless cycles of repression, poverty 
and replanting of coca leaf. It is therefore 
essential that policymakers move beyond 
this spurious, yet damaging, precept. 
Bolivian Community Coca Control
The death of two coca growers at the hands 
of government eradication forces in October 
2004 (just weeks after a negative evalua-
tion of Bolivian eradication efforts by the US 
government) sparked massive social unrest 
in the Chapare region of Bolivia. To calm 
the growing tension the Mesa administra-
tion (2003-2005) accepted a longstanding 
demand of Chapare coca growers, the right 
for each family to cultivate a small plot of 
coca, or ‘cato’ (1600 square meters) destined 
for the licit market. The concession, which 
flew in the face of US eradication mandates, 
effectively ended forced eradication in the 
region. The initiative marked a shift in vision 
away from the US-imposed narrative, which 
portrayed coca farmers as active participants 
in the drug trade, to subsistence farmers 
working to feed their families. 
With the launch of the cato policy, pro-
tests, violence and human rights violations 
subsided immediately. Union members went 
from staunch resistance to the government 
to active citizen participants, working to limit 
their crop to one cato per union member. 
The program’s underlying logic helped to 
guarantee its success:  the equitable distribu-
tion of the small plots of coca among estab-
lished union families effectively increased 
leaf prices and provided each family with the 
equivalent of a monthly minimum wage. 
The ‘cato accord’ was initially designed as 
a temporary measure;9 however, on  entering 
office in 2006 President Evo Morales (an 
ex-coca grower) adopted the cato system as the 
cornerstone of his coca control strategy and 
extended it to other coca-growing regions, 
including the La Paz Yungas (Bolivia’s largest 
coca-growing region). Morales also increased 
the previous cap on coca cultivation from 
12,000 to 20,000 hectares nationally. With 
funding from the EU, the Morales adminis-
tration designed and implemented a multi-
faceted strategy to support the project. The 
six pillars include:
1.  Land titling for coca-growing families 
with catos.
2.  Biometric registry of coca growers 
authorized to grow the cato. 
3.  The registration and recurring meas-
urement of each cato of coca by the 
state monitoring organization, the 
Economic and Social Development 
Unit (UDESTRO by its Spanish 
acronym). 
4.  The creation and maintenance of a 
sophisticated database (SISCOCA), 
which aids the monitoring of coca cul-
tivation and traces coca leaf transport 
and sales.
5.  Integrated development projects to 
complement subsistence income gen-
erated by the cato.
6.  The empowerment of the community 
to self-police in order to restrict coca 
cultivation to the one-cato limit. This 
includes training for union representa-
tives on database use and community 
joint action to monitor and restrict 
coca planting.
This innovative program did not emerge 
overnight but rather was built on the pre-
vious efforts of the Coca Federations and 
the EU’s municipal strengthening program 
(PRAEDAC by its Spanish acronym). Initiated 
in 1998 (during the peak of US-driven forced 
eradication), the landmark EU initiative func-
tioned on the premise that poverty reduction 
(through providing basic services), engaging 
coca grower organizations, land titling and 
strengthening local governments can con-
tribute to break farmers’ reliance on coca 
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(Farthing & Kohl 2005: 191). The German 
Technical Cooperation observed, ‘A key func-
tion of the EU’s policy has been to offer an 
alternative to the military focus and prohibi-
tionist paradigm that USAID simultaneously 
proposed and implemented.’ Within this 
context, the PRAEDAC project has been the 
best ‘alternative example during the most 
conflictive period in the Cochabamba Tropics 
(Chapare)’ (Addicks et al 2010: 35). One coca 
grower mayor affirmed, 
Alternative development was pre-
viously conditioned on coca eradi-
cation. In contrast, PRAEDAC has 
supported the municipalities uncon-
ditionally and has been open to par-
ticipation and [community] control. 
This means that PRAEDAC respects 
the population and our local leaders.10 
Nicolaus Hansmann, attaché to the 
Cooperation Section of the European Union 
in Bolivia, told the authors that beyond its 
concrete on-the-ground achievements, one 
of PRAEDAC’s most significant contributions 
was to change the image of alternative devel-
opment and to build trust in government 
and legitimate the state in the region.11 Evo 
Morales described the EU-funded project 
as ‘allies’ who, unlike USAID, ‘didn’t condi-
tion or blackmail.’ (Los Tiempos 2006). In 
other words, PRAEDAC created a credible 
foundation for community coca control. In 
fact, the Morales administration hired many 
 ex-PRAEDAC Bolivian professionals to help 
design the country’s coca control initiative.12
Building on this groundwork, once in power 
Morales’s Movement Towards Socialism 
(MAS by its Spanish acronym) administration 
channelled development assistance to coca-
growing regions and increased state pres-
ence through investments in roads, schools 
and health posts to bring the region into 
the economic and social mainstream. The 
government has also provided farming com-
munities with access to mechanized tools 
to speed up production, such as rice husk-
ing machines and tractors, established cold 
chains for dairy produce and built fruit and 
honey processing plants in the region. These 
initiatives have expanded the market for local 
produce. One farmer explained that the fruit 
juice processing plant (a state-owned enter-
prise run by a local union) buys his oranges 
at a set price and does not require him to be 
part of a ‘producers association’. Others gave 
similarly upbeat appraisals. 
In contrast to US-driven initiatives, these 
government-led programs recognize the 
importance of restricted coca cultivation and 
the strategic advantage of working with the 
well-organized union structure. The Chapare 
farmers are making the most of these oppor-
tunities and are successfully diversifying 
their sources of income. Giovanni Terrazas,13 
the architect responsible for UDESTRO’s 
development arm, spoke about the success 
of fish farming in the region: ‘we set up 
twelve model ponds and they were a success. 
The farmers saw that it was profitable and 
they said, “I can do it too” and they started to 
dig their own pools; now there are 82 such 
ponds.’ The farmers concur with Giovanni’s 
analysis. One woman explained to the 
authors that her fishpond generated twice 
the revenue of a cato and she said that she 
might abandon coca altogether. These pro-
jects are reducing the farmers’ dependency 
on coca, with many now describing coca in 
terms of a ‘savings account’ rather than their 
main source of income for daily expendi-
tures. The fact that coca growers are willing 
to assume the risk associated with alternative 
income sources – be it fish farming or grow-
ing oranges – marks an important subjective 
change. In 2011 the UNODC noted that for 
the first time there had been a significant 
expansion of non-coca crops in the zone 
(UNODC 2011: 47); even USAID echoed the 
sentiment (GAO 2012: 17). 
Chapare residents claim that today there 
are more jobs in non-agricultural work, gov-
ernment scholarships have allowed their 
children to study at university and access to 
cheap government loans means that they are 
now able to start their own businesses. The 
economic upturn is visible. Until 2006 most 
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people used bicycles to get around but today 
they have Chinese-built motorcycles and 
some even have cars. The coca growers have 
begun to replace their wooden shacks with 
houses made from bricks and mortar and, as 
a result of government infrastructure pro-
grams, access to basic services has expanded 
dramatically.
PRAEDAC’s initial efforts to strengthen 
Chapare local government and reduce pov-
erty allowed for the successful transition of 
coca control agencies (previously funded 
and supervised by the US Narcotics Affairs 
Section, NAS) to be efficiently run by farmer 
representatives. The state offices that moni-
tor the distribution of the coca crop and plan 
its reduction (UDESTRO) now integrate local 
civil society representatives into state insti-
tutions, further enhancing their legitimacy. 
Coca growers told the authors that workers 
at UDESTRO are now viewed as compañeros 
(partners) as opposed to enemies. One 
female farmer explained, ‘they understand 
that we depend on coca’ and ‘we can talk to 
them, if there is a problem, then we can find 
a solution.’14 Credible, first-hand knowledge 
of coca farming, rapport and capacity built 
through training has led to the development 
of transparent and efficient systems and 
guidelines that protect the subsistence rights 
of the farmer. 
The control initiative also demonstrates 
Bolivia’s commitment to addressing the 
international community’s concerns about 
coca cultivation for the illegal market. The 
Morales administration has made efforts to 
industrialize coca for licit uses, including set-
ting up coca processing plants to manufac-
ture coca tea in sachets, along with a range of 
other products. However, for the meantime 
these plants run well below capacity because 
coca remains on the UN list of restricted 
substances; as such, these products cannot 
be legally exported and the domestic legal 
market cannot soak up Bolivia’s current coca 
production. An EU-funded study suggests 
that Bolivia needs 14,000 hectares to satisfy 
domestic consumption (CONALTID 2013), 
far below Bolivia’s current production levels . 
Today Bolivian government and UNODC 
monitoring teams can accurately measure 
the coca crop and its distribution in situ.15 
As a result, for the first time in any country, 
there is a consensus amongst major play-
ers and the international community about 
how much coca there is and where it can 
be found.16 The data shows that in 2010 
the Bolivian coca crop stood at 31,000 hec-
tares but by 2014 it had declined to 20,400 
hectares, less than half the coca found in 
either Peru or Colombia (UNODC 2015b). 
Significantly, Bolivia has dramatically 
reduced its coca supply while respecting new 
benchmarks for success, including respect 
for human rights, full citizenship rights for 
farmers, empowering local communities and 
developing long-term economic alternatives 
to coca (Farthing & Ledebur 2015; Youngers & 
Ledebur 2015). Undoubtedly, a negotiated 
approach like Bolivia’s community control 
takes longer to show results than forced 
eradication, yet coca reduction under the 
new system can be more readily sustained 
as farmers are provided with real economic 
alternatives. 
How Community Coca Control Works on 
the Ground
Strong agricultural unions characterize the 
Chapare region. At the grassroots are the 
sindicatos, territorially bound self-govern-
ing units composed of anything from 20 
to 200 people. The sindicatos are grouped 
into sub-centrals, which in turn make up six 
federations representing more than 40,000 
families. In the past policy makers viewed 
Bolivia’s coca grower organizations as an 
impediment to coca control. In contrast, 
today they are seen as key to the effective 
implementation of the cato policy and com-
plementary development initiatives.
In order to gain a cato, each member of 
a sindicato has to acquire a land title, regis-
ter for a bio-metric ID card and have their 
cato measured and logged by the state coca 
monitoring institution (UDESTRO). It is then 
largely up to the sindicatos to exercise inter-
nal controls to ensure that nobody exceeds 
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this limit. The sindicatos are well positioned 
to do this as they have a long history of self-
governing (Grisaffi 2013). Over the periods 
2005-2007 and 2013-2014, Grisaffi attended 
regular Coca Federation meetings in the 
Chapare where he witnessed farmers evalu-
ating coca policy and enacting decisions 
with the participation of the entire commu-
nity.  Base level sindicatos carry out regular 
checks of coca plantations to ensure that 
all members comply with the agreement. 
First time offenders lose their right to grow 
coca for one year while repeat offenders lose 
coca-growing rights permanently and can be 
expelled from their community. Coca grow-
ers confirmed that the rules of the game are 
clearly defined and they perceive the conse-
quences for breaking the agreement to be 
fair and logical (Grisaffi 2016). The sindicatos 
are serious about self-monitoring; indeed, 
farmers claim that the controls are tighter 
today than when the US ‘zero coca’ policies 
were enforced.17
 Farmers have good reasons to self-police. 
They designed the policy through partici-
pation at grassroots meetings, giving them 
a strong sense of ownership over it. Indeed 
farmers often refer to the accord as ‘our lit-
tle cato’, others say that they respect the 
cato because, ‘we fought for it’. Moreover, 
the farmers know that by restricting coca 
cultivation the price of coca goes up. Thus 
envidia (jealousy) plays an important role; 
one farmer said, ‘look – everyone knows 
how much coca I have and they don’t want 
me to get rich at their expense.’ As a result, 
he said, ‘…they would not hesitate to turn 
me in.’18 Finally the coca growers identify 
strongly with the goals of the MAS admin-
istration; they sincerely believe that they 
have a duty to respect the cato as a support 
to Morales who they know is working to 
legalize coca at the international level. One 
Federation leader explained, ‘We respect 
the cato to shut up the international 
community.’19 
Figure 4: Chapare coca leaf drying (Photo Courtesy of Thomas Grisaffi).
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In spite of these advances, challenges per-
sist with policy implementation, including 
a minority of farmers who refuse comply 
with the regime. When a sindicato fails to 
exercise adequate control, representatives 
from UDESTRO negotiate with community 
leaders and, if need be, they will organ-
ize for the coca to be forcibly eradicated. 
However, violence no longer accompanies 
eradication; as one female coca leader 
explains, ‘we no longer rebel when they 
come to cut the coca – we just show them 
where it is and let them get on with their 
work.’ Another explained that before they 
were afraid of the security forces but now 
they see them as partners.20 
Since the launch of the cato accord the 
coca growers are now motivated to actively 
collaborate in the fight against drug produc-
tion. Each sindicato takes on the responsibil-
ity to ensure that none of its members are 
involved in processing cocaine paste. If a 
production site is found on a members’ plot, 
then the landowner will immediately lose 
their cato and potentially also their land. The 
profits derived from processing cocaine paste 
are so slim that most farmers are not willing 
to run this risk. Rather, they are much more 
likely to denounce traffickers to the police. 
As a result of this pressure, the cocaine paste 
producers have been forced to alter their 
behaviour, with many shifting their opera-
tions deeper into the jungle, but also outside 
of the Chapare and into urban areas (Grisaffi 
2014a).
Community coca control is not easy and 
demands constant negotiations with coca-
growing communities; however, the long-
term impact far outweighs its shortcomings. 
From the perspective of the Chapare coca 
growers, the new policy is a step in the right 
direction. The violence provoked by forced 
coca eradication is regarded as a thing of the 
past and they have been able to re-establish 
themselves after years of impoverishment. 
Most coca growers agree that limiting coca 
cultivation is a small price to pay for peace, 
full citizenship and economic stability. 
Although the US refuses to acknowledge 
this, the program also meets stated US goals 
to reduce coca acreage. In this sense it is a 
win-win situation. 
Best Practices from Bolivia
The United States has been highly critical of 
Bolivia’s coca policy; in September 2015 the 
White House renewed the ‘decertification’ of 
Bolivia for the eighth consecutive year, stat-
ing that the country had ‘failed demonstrably 
in the past twelve months to make substan-
tial efforts to adhere to its obligations under 
international counter-narcotics agreements’ 
(The White House 2015). Not all evaluations 
have been so negative, however. In 2014 the 
EU Ambassador to Bolivia explained, ‘our 
efforts have been a success; you can also see 
the impact in the effective and sustained 
reduction of coca production…The European 
Union’s experience has been very positive’ 
(ERBOL 2014). The Organization of American 
States (OAS) cited Bolivia’s community coca 
control program as an example of, 
best practices that are not just well 
known but are also available for 
implementation and replication. . . 
initiatives that enrich dialogue and 
can inspire each country to under-
stand how it can successfully manage 
the various challenges posed by drugs 
within its particular context and eco-
nomic, political and social circum-
stances (Briones et al 2013: 6). 
The 2016 UNGASS will see a significant lobby 
(including the EU and OAS) to advance ‘alter-
native development’ instead of militarized 
enforcement (Buxton 2015). It is essential 
then that policy makers do not repeat the 
same old mistakes. Bolivia provides valuable 
insights into how a different and more effec-
tive development strategy might be pursued. 
The Bolivian case shows that successful crop 
reduction depends on the state treating coca 
farmers as citizens and partners, rather than 
as criminals who actively stimulate the drug 
trade. Land titling combined with the legal 
recognition of a limited amount of coca can 
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create the framework for non-repressive 
state engagement and the protection of citi-
zen rights. The Bolivian experience illustrates 
that strong social organizations, with a sense 
of group efficacy, have to be permitted within 
a state structure and be recognized as valid 
counterparts in local coca control and devel-
opment. Thus another important step is the 
strengthening of local government (includ-
ing capacity building and guaranteed budget 
provision) to allow it to act upon coca grower 
demands. The EU’s municipal strengthening 
program in the Chapare region is a key exam-
ple in this regard.
National governments and their local 
operators also need to focus on provid-
ing adequate social services, such as road 
infrastructure, health and education (basic 
responsibilities of all states) without condi-
tioning them as rewards for eradication of 
coca crops. Delinking human development 
from crop and drug control objectives is an 
indispensable prerequisite to establish the 
legitimacy of state actions and the trust to 
implement further initiatives. Control efforts 
will inevitably fail if policymakers continue 
to operate a system that encourages people 
in coca-producing regions to perceive the 
government as a repressor and not as a ser-
vice provider. 
Finally, coca production cannot be signifi-
cantly reduced without implementation of a 
viable sustainable livelihoods approach. It is 
common sense that proper sequencing is a 
crucial element to integrated development 
in coca producing regions. Yet, the Bolivian 
approach goes further by employing sub-
sistence income from coca (which has no 
comparable substitute in terms of income 
generation) as the anchor for unprecedented 
income and crop diversification. It is not fea-
sible to apply Bolivia’s unique home-grown 
strategy in other coca-growing or illicit 
crop production regions without significant 
modification appropriate to each context. 
Nevertheless, the community coca control 
initiative presents some fundamental ele-
ments that could be adapted and integrated 
into strategies elsewhere.
The continuing presence of violent non-
state actors and competing interests on the 
ground – including various illicit industries 
like mining and logging – complicate the 
implementation of similar initiatives in Peru 
and Colombia.21 Yet, in spite of the crimi-
nalization of the coca farmers and on-going 
conflict, civil society organizations exist in 
both countries, often organizing to resist 
state eradication efforts (Durand Ochoa 
2014; Ramirez 2011). Following the Bolivian 
example, the authors argue that rather than 
an impediment to coca control or a ‘threat’, 
these organizations and their members are 
the key to successful implementation of 
coca control policies, income diversifica-
tion programs and ensuring the rule of law. 
For example the presence of strong social 
organizations in some coca-growing regions 
of Peru, paired with a significant licit coca 
market, provides potential tools to work 
with to implement community coca control. 
However, Peru’s President Ollanta Humala 
remains firmly committed to US-funded 
forced eradication.22 
The Colombian coca farmers have long 
advocated alternative approaches to coca 
control. For example in 1994 (before the 
advent of aerial fumigation) Colombian 
farmers proposed a coca-for-subsistence 
model with production ceilings for com-
munity coca reduction. The government 
rejected this innovative approach and coca 
production spiralled thereafter.23 The end of 
aerial fumigation and increased potential for 
a peace accord between the Colombian gov-
ernment and the FARC indicate that there 
is political will to look for alternatives. The 
draft agreement on ‘The Solution to the Illicit 
Drug Problem’ calls for voluntary crop reduc-
tion, integrated sustainable development ini-
tiatives and the active participation of local 
communities in planning and execution, all 
features of the Bolivian model. However, in 
spite of these positive steps, the Colombian 
government continues to insist on the total 
elimination of coca production and that crop 
‘substitution’ is possible and viable (Schaffer & 
Youngers 2015).
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The draft version of the peace accord con-
ditions development assistance and state 
engagement on farmers meeting prior agree-
ments for coca eradication. It puts timelines 
for compliance in place without establish-
ing similar deadlines for the state initiative. 
The accord also sets unrealistic timespans 
for the provision of aid that will guarantee 
subsistence until other sources of income 
can be implemented. The government pro-
poses six months while the FARC has sug-
gested two years (Mesa de Conversaciones 
2014). Looking at the Bolivian experience the 
authors would suggest far longer is needed. 
Bolivia’s sustainable development initiatives 
took almost a decade to be consolidated and 
still farmers are dependent on coca. In short, 
the FARC-Government of Colombia accords 
borrow key pillars of Bolivia’s community 
coca control strategy without adopting its 
indispensable cornerstones:  coca for sub-
sistence and lack of conditionality. Without 
modification, this strategy risks falling 
short of its objective and justifying further 
violent forced eradication, fumigation and 
repression.
Conclusion
Peru, Colombia and Bolivia share a long 
history of ineffectual forced eradication, 
criminalization of coca farmers and failed 
development initiatives. So long as external 
demand for illicit drugs remains, people will 
keep growing coca because it presents a solu-
tion to families’ subsistence needs, which 
cannot be easily replaced. Thus all that drug 
policy makers can realistically ever achieve 
is to affect how and where coca is grown. 
Given these parameters, if US policymakers 
remain committed to supply-side initiatives 
then they should opt for reduced coca pro-
duction with guaranteed subsistence as a 
human alternative to the myth of total eradi-
cation. Less coca grown by engaged citizens, 
Figure 5: A Chapare family bags coca leaves (Photo courtesy of Thomas Grisaffi).
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who can feed their families, is preferable to 
continued eradication with the associated 
violence, poverty and recurring failure.
To achieve sustainable, effective and safe 
coca reduction, the Bolivian experience 
teaches that governments should provide 
basic services and infrastructure in compli-
ance with their obligations to their citizens 
and not as incentives for crop reduction. 
States and the international community 
should seek to empower grassroots organi-
zations and create the conditions for their 
inclusion and collaboration with coca policy. 
Finally, the international community must 
shift its focus and demands away from mean-
ingless eradication statistics to human devel-
opment indicators to measure progress in 
coca-growing regions. Bolivia’s experiment 
with community coca control opens the door 
for other countries to experiment with alter-
native approaches to reduce coca acreage. 
Competing Interests
The authors declare that they have no com-
peting interests. 
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the partici-
pants at the ‘Insecure Spaces in Latin America: 
Encounters with Violence and Drugs’ work-
shop, held at the University of Oxford 
(27th November 2014). The authors would also 
like to thank the following people and organ-
isations, Insa Koch, Linda Farthing, Nicolaus 
Hansmann, Pedro Arenas, Ricardo Vargas, the 
Unidad de Control Social Vice Ministerio de 
Defensa Social, and The Federación Especial 
de Trabajadores Campesinos del Trópico de 
Cochabamba (FETCTC).
Notes
 1 This research was funded by the Open 
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Society Foundation’s Drugs, Security and 
Democracy Fellowship, the Leverhulme 
Trust and the Economic and Social 
Research Council. 
 2 In Colombia, some indigenous peoples 
have traditionally used coca; however, 
as they represent a very small segment 
of Colombia’s population (around 3 per 
cent) coca use is very restricted. 
 3 The justification for classifying coca as 
an illegal substance has its roots in a 
UN study published in 1950. This study 
has since been discredited as inaccurate 
and racist for its characterization of coca 
chewing as a disgusting, backward and 
dangerous habit. 
 4 These negative environmental impacts 
are not restricted to coca farming. We 
might expect similar results if tropical 
colonization was provoked by gold min-
ing, logging or ranching. 
 5 Since 2009 UNODC data shows that over-
all coca crop acreage has decreased (mostly 
driven down by efforts in Colombia).
 6 In 2000 the US and Colombia jointly 
launched Plan Colombia, an eight-billion 
dollar ‘aid’ package (80 per cent of which 
is destined for the police and military) 
with the stated aim to reduce narcotics 
production by half within six years and to 
regain security in the country. 
 7 Author interview with coca farmer 2006
 8 Author interview, Egberto Chipana. 
Chipiriri, Chapare, 2006.
 9 The terms of the October 2004 accord 
stipulated that the cato policy and coca 
distribution would be re-evaluated 
after the publication of a broad-based 
legal market study. Publication of the 
long-awaited study occurred in October 
2013.
 10 Feliciano Mamani, Villa Tunari Mayor. 
Author interview 12 December 2007
 11 Nicolaus Hansmann, EU. 11 November 
2014, electronic communication
 12 Author interviews with Carlos Hoffman, 
2010, 2011, 2012 and Jonas Rojas 2010.
 13 Author interviews with Giovanni Terazzas, 
Shinahota, Chapare 2013.
 14 Author interview with farmer, Chapare 
2013
 15 Bolivia shares its coca data with the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
 16 Coca data in Bolivia is now so accu-
rate that in 2013 the United States 
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government felt obliged to quietly down-
scale their own coca growing estimates 
for Bolivia during Morales’s tenure by an 
average of 5000 hectares per year (AIN 
2014).
 17 To date more than 800 farmers have lost 
the right to cato because of non-compli-
ance (Opinión 2014).
 18 Author interview with farmer, Chapare 
2013
 19 Author interview with farmer, Chapare 
2013
 20 Author interview with farmer, Chapare 
2013
 21 Email Communication with Pedro Arenas, 
Observatorio de Cultivos Declarados 
Ilicitos. 16 November 2014.
 22 Email Communication with Ricardo 
Soberón, 27 October 2014.
 23 Email Communication with Pedro Arenas, 
Observatorio de Cultivos Declarados 
Ilicitos. 18 November 2014
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